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ABSTRACT
Background Decisions on limiting life-sustaining
treatment for patients in the vegetative state (VS) are
emotionally and morally challenging. In Germany, doctors
have to discuss, together with the legal surrogate (often
a family member), whether the proposed treatment is in
accordance with the patient’s will. However, it is
unknown whether family members of the patient in the
VS actually base their decisions on the patient’s wishes.
Objective To examine the role of advance directives,
orally expressed wishes, or the presumed will of patients
in a VS for family caregivers’ decisions on life-sustaining
treatment.
Methods and sample A qualitative interview study
with 14 next of kin of patients in a VS in a long-term care
setting was conducted; 13 participants were the
patient’s legal surrogates. Interviews were analysed
according to qualitative content analysis.
Results The majority of family caregivers said that they
were aware of aforementioned wishes of the patient that
could be applied to the VS condition, but did not base
their decisions primarily on these wishes. They gave
three reasons for this: (a) the expectation of clinical
improvement, (b) the caregivers’ definition of life-
sustaining treatments and (c) the moral obligation not to
harm the patient. If the patient’s wishes were not known
or not revealed, the caregivers interpreted a will to live
into the patient’s survival and non-verbal behaviour.
Conclusions Whether or not prior treatment wishes of
patients in a VS are respected depends on their
applicability, and also on the medical assumptions and
moral attitudes of the surrogates. We recommend
repeated communication, support for the caregivers and
advance care planning.
BACKGROUND
Some patients show signs of wakefulness as
demonstrated by eye opening, but are incapable of
a meaningful reaction to stimuli. This condition is
known as the vegetative state (VS).1 Decisions on
life-sustaining treatment for patients in the VS
have been an issue of intense discussions over the
last 40 years. Life-sustaining treatment can be
deﬁned as any treatment without which the
patient would die from a life-limiting disease
within a foreseeable time frame.2 Such decisions
are extremely challenging for professional care
personnel and surrogate decision makers, who are
quite frequently the patient’s next of kin. Cases
that were legally contested by the patients’ next of
kin have led to controversial public debates about
the moral justiﬁcation of the withdrawal of artiﬁ-
cial nutrition and hydration (ANH) for patients in
a VS.3 Meanwhile England, Wales, Germany and
other countries have laws stipulating that a valid
and applicable advance refusal is binding and that
surrogates have to acknowledge the patient’s
expressed will.4 The legal regulation in Germany is
such that a dialogue between the doctor and the
legal surrogate forms the basis for the legal surro-
gate’s decision to agree or disagree with the appli-
cation of treatment. The doctor has to suggest
which treatment goals can be achieved by means of
therapeutic measures, which is often referred to as
the medical indication of a treatment. Then it has
to be investigated with the legal surrogate whether
the proposed treatment is in accordance with the
patient’s advance directive or presumed will.
Treatment omission or withdrawal in accordance
with the patient’s will is lawful in Germany.
Treatment decisions for patients in a VS have
to be made despite a high level of uncertainty
regarding diagnosis,5 therapeutic success and prog-
nosis.6 Even though it used to be a core diagnostic
criterion, it has recently been challenged by
neuroscientists whether all patients in a VS have
actually lost consciousness.7 Consequently, diag-
nostic classiﬁcation has been questioned and
bedside examination alone does not seem sufﬁcient
to make a reliable diagnosis. An accurate diagnosis
has implications for the course of a potential
recovery8 and for symptom control treatment.9
Traditionally, recovery from VS more than a year
after a traumatic brain injury and 6 months after
a non-traumatic brain injury is regarded as highly
improbable10 but not totally impossible, seeing as
some cases of late recovery have been published in
the literature.6 11 Decisions on limiting life-
sustaining treatment should be made with refer-
ence to the ethical principles of the patient’s
autonomy and best interests.12
Usually the next of kin are advocated as surro-
gate decision makers, because they are thought to
know the patient’s wishes and values best and are
most interested in the well-being of the patient.13
Yet, studies using hypothetical case scenarios have
shown that surrogate decision makers may inac-
curately represent the patient’s treatment wishes.14
It remains unclear whether surrogates in fact decide
according to the patient’s will, especially in cases of
VS where uncertainty is so prominent. We explored
this question in a qualitative interview study.
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METHODS AND PARTICIPANTS
From 2009 to 2011 a total of 14 next of kin, who were taking
care of 12 patients in a VS from throughout Germany, were
recruited with the help of the following gatekeepers: (1) the
head nurse of a nursing home ward specialising in the long-term
rehabilitation of patients in a VS, (2) a doctor working for
a nationwide outpatient care service, (3) the case manager of
a nationwide outpatient care service and (4) a counsellor for
family caregivers for severely disabled patients. Gatekeepers
either distributed invitation letters or contacted family care-
givers directly to inform their clients of the study. Criteria
oriented, purposeful sampling was conducted in order to have
the maximum variety of cases according to the following char-
acteristics: patientecaregiver relationship (parents, children and
partners), duration of being in the VS (short, medium and long
term) and care institution (professional care institutions and
private homes). Interviews were conducted until a satisfactory
sample of perspectives on limiting life-sustaining treatment was
found (rejection of treatment limitation, consideration of
treatment limitation under circumstances, agreement with
limitation of treatment). Inclusion criteria, with reference to the
patient, was being in a condition where recovery was highly
improbable, so at least 6 months after non-traumatic brain
injury and 12 months after traumatic brain injury.10 Participants
were required to be able to speak German ﬂuently. The inter-
views were carried out by two interviewers: the ﬁrst author,
a psychologist, and the second author, a doctor, both skilled in
qualitative interview methods. The interviews were conducted
with three mothers, eight spouses (one ﬁancée, one ex-wife) and
three sons of mothers in a VS. Except for one relative, all were
the legal surrogates of the patient. Table 1 shows the demo-
graphic data of the sample group. The local research ethics
committee granted ethical approval for this project. Participants
were approached according to local research protocols and
informed consent was obtained.
The patients lived in the following settings: (1) a nursing
home ward specialising in the long-term rehabilitation of
patients in a VS, (2) community homes for patients requiring 24-
h respiratory or intensive care service and (3) private homes. At
the time of the interview, the patients had been in a VS for
9 months (in a case of hypoxic brain injury) to 15 years.
We conducted semistructured interviews on the participants’
decision making about life-sustaining treatment. We also
investigated the caregivers’ understanding of the illness and their
burden, which will not be reported in this article. The caregivers
were asked, among other questions, the following: ‘Have you
ever asked yourself, if it would be better not to administer life-
sustaining treatment in his/her [ie, the patient’s] case? Please
narrate’. The interviews took place at the institutions where the
patients were in care or at a neutral place in the University
Hospital where the authors worked. They were audio recorded,
transcribed following adapted transcription rules and veriﬁed by
one of the interviewers. The transcripts were analysed by means
of the MAXqda software (VERBI GmbH, Berlin, Germany)
using the qualitative content analysis method according to
Mayring.15 Meaningful parts of the material were selected
inductively to answer the research question: ‘How do family
surrogates of chronic VS patients deal with previously expressed
wishes and the presumed will of the patient regarding life-
sustaining treatment?’ The participants’ key statements in
answer to the research question were selected. Repetitive
statements were reduced, paraphrased to a general declaration
and abstracted. The entire material was analysed and sorted
according to the abstract categories by using a coding guide. For
the purpose of this publication, selected quotes were translated
by an English native speaker. The interview guide, transcription
rules and coding guide can be obtained from the authors upon
request.
RESULTS
Knowledge of patients’ wishes
The results of the content analysis of the patients’ wishes and
their representations are illustrated in table 2. In half of the
studied cases, family caregivers reported statements made prior to
VS by the patient that could be applied to the current situation.
Those family caregivers that did not report knowledge of prior
wishes interpreted a will to live in the patient’s survival or non-
verbal behaviour. The following comment was made with
reference to a moment in which a doctor, while standing at the
patient’s bedside, made the suggestion to discontinue life-
sustaining treatment, and at that moment, the patient opened
her eyes.
‘The decision was actually there from the beginning, because I
know my daughter and at the moment when he [ie, the doctor]
said, she can’t do that [ie, opening the eyes], and she did it, as
though she had heard it, I knew: No.’
(Mother, P. 2a)
How the expectation of recovery overrules an advance directive
In two interviews conducted with the sons of a patient, one
reported knowing of an advance directive and orally expressed
wishes by his mother, in which artiﬁcial nutrition had been
refused without explicit reference to a VS condition. At the time
of the interview both of her sons shared the view that artiﬁcial
nutrition should be maintained, yet resuscitation may be
withheld.
‘(.) With regard to her advance directive, yes it exists. It actually
prohibits artiﬁcial nutrition, so yes, she crossed that off (.). Her
position was pretty clear on that, to me at least. I think to all of us
children (.). But this situation we have through this acute,
through this unforeseen, through this brain haemorrhage as well as
(.) through the uncertainty of how the condition is progressing,
like how can it be. (.) We have never seen the situation that way,
as an actual artiﬁcial way of maintaining life, but rather as as
a recovery process or a a kind of process where I think to myself:
that makes sense. And that is still not neglecting her wishes.’
(Son, P. 3b)
Table 1 Demographic data of the sample
Patients, n[12 Next of kin, n[14
Ages, in years
Median 50 54
Range 36e71 34e74
Gender, %
Female 50% 50%
Care institution, frequency
Private home n¼4 (33%)
Nursing home n¼8 (67%)
Relationship, frequency
Parentechild n¼2 n¼3
Childeparent n¼3 n¼3
Partner n¼8 n¼8
Time spent in vegetative state, months
Median 52
Range 9e183 months
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This particular son had difﬁculties explaining his thoughts,
which became evident by the interrupted grammatical structure
and his repetition of words. He weighed his mother ’s wishes
against his own impression of the illness and his own assess-
ment of her recovery potential. The patient was continuously
artiﬁcially nourished and hydrated. He reached the decision that
he would not accept intensive care measures or surgery for his
mother in case of complications or comorbidity. Yet, if there was
a treatment option that would improve her condition, for
example neurosurgery, he would agree to it. That resembles the
next argument that was also present in two other cases.
How defining life-sustaining treatment measures
guide decisions
A family caregiver had previously spoken with his wife about
life-sustaining treatment measures while the patient’s father
had been care dependent. The patient’s wish was clear to the
spouse, even though the topic of their discussion was not the
VS. He was determined to comply with her wishes. He was
convinced that if she had a chance to end her life, ‘to jump from
a bridge’, she would do it.
‘So we actually spoke about what if this and that would happen. Well
she didn’t want life-prolonging treatment under any circumstances.’
(Husband, P. 11)
This patient was continuously artiﬁcially nourished and
hydrated, but the relative did not perceive the ANH as being
a form of life-sustaining treatment. He was of the opinion that
because healthy people would also be nourished, ANH was
neither artiﬁcial nor invasive. To him it was not a treatment
measure at all. He said, he would consent to antibiotics that
could cure pneumonia, but not if there was a more serious and
complicated infection. Thus, the effectiveness of the treatment
also inﬂuenced his decision on where to draw the line.
‘Now we have to differentiate between life sustaining and life
prolonging, am I right? (.) It depends on what her chances are in
each concrete situation. In case of a lung infection one agrees [ie,
with the administration of antibiotics], but if the condition
deteriorates severely I would decide according to her wish.’
(Husband, P. 11)
Instead of considering having the ANH withdrawn, he thinks
back counterfactually to his standpoint; if he could have fore-
seen the outcome of the surgery, he would not have agreed to it.
In contrast to ANH, surgery was a treatment measure that he
could have rejected.
‘If I had known back then when they operated (.) known what the
the the consequences would be.(.) how the condition would be,
I would not have agreed to it. Because I’m quite sure that she
wouldn’t want what she has now under any circumstances.’
(Husband, P. 11)
In a similar case, the husband of a patient rejected artiﬁcial
respiration after his wife had a sepsis. He assumed that this
treatment measure was life prolonging. Meanwhile he agreed
with all other treatment measures and hoped for her survival.
How the moral obligation not to harm the patient prevents
a decision
A family caregiver used a double standard in making surrogate
decisions for the patient and making decisions for herself. She
reported that the hospital referred her to a lawyer who could
have advised her on the possibility of discontinuing nutrition.
‘Many family members do that now, they stop the nutrition, and
only provide ﬂuids. That takes about 2e3 months, but I mean no! I
couldn’t do something like that. (.) I think it’s inhumane. Because,
I don’t know, I still don’t know if he is able to perceive things. And
he already had problems with his stomach and still for me it is
starvation. So I wouldn’t do it. If his heart were to fail now and he
wouldn’t be brought back, that’s something different. But apart
from that everything will proceed as it was. I couldn’t do that.’
(Wife, P. 10)
It is most important for her that the patient is not harmed
and does not have to suffer from either treatment or treatment
withdrawal. Later, she was asked by the interviewer (I) what she
would want if she had the same condition. What the respondent
(R) had termed inhumane for her husband is exactly what she
wished for herself:
R: ‘Unplug everything.’
I: ‘Everything?’
R: ‘Everything.’
Table 2 Categorical analysis of the representation of the patient’s wishes in interviews with family caregivers
Form of representation Wish Tendency of wish
Written advance directive No artificial nutrition and hydration (P. 3) Refusal of life
sustaining treatmentNo enduring life sustaining treatment, if a ‘normal’ life isn’t possible (P. 1)
No tubes (P. 9)
Anticipatory oral statements No life-prolonging treatment (P. 6)
No tubes when I’m in a VS (P. 7)
No life in a wheelchair (P. 10)
No life-prolonging treatment in a condition like after a stroke (P. 11)
Presumed will based on the patient’s
prior identity
She wouldn’t have wanted to live like this (P. 8)
He wouldn’t have been able to deal with illness or disability (P. 12)
If she could kill herself for example, jump from a bridge, she would do it (P. 11)
Presumed will based on the patient’s survival He is a ‘fighter’ because he survived a crisis (eg, a sepsis) (P. 4; P. 6) Ongoing will to live
He is not dissatisfied with his situation, otherwise his condition would deteriorate (P. 9)
He decides himself: If he wants to die he will just die (P. 4; P. 9)
Presumed will based on the patient’s
current behaviour
She gives ‘signs’ (eg, open eyes) that she wants to live (P. 2a)
Through participation in physiotherapy she shows her will to live (P. 3a)
He wants to live because he participates in the care process and reacts to appeal (P. 5)
The type of representation of the patient’s wish, the content of the wish and the tendency for or against life sustaining treatment are shown. The numbers mark the interview participants (not
the patients).
VS, vegetative state.
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I: ‘Including the artiﬁcial nutrition?’
R: ‘Yeah, everything. Well I wouldn’t want to live like that. Mm
Mm [negation]. Before, you haven’t made up your mind. But if you
experience something like that for yourself, then no.’
I: ‘But you’ve just said that starvation is inhumane.’
R: ‘Yes, for others. For myself, phh [non-verbal expression, to say I
don’t mind].’
(Wife, P. 10)
The patient’s will was not precisely against living in
a VS. According to his wife he never wanted to live in a wheel-
chair. The wife justiﬁes this wish by deciding to withhold
resuscitation treatment, if the patient were to experience cardiac
arrest again. She would not like to inﬂict pain upon the patient
and sees resuscitation as a measure that would not cause him
pain if omitted. She also refuses artiﬁcial respiration. In her eyes,
the patient’s condition is not burdensome to himself. She is
a relative who no longer has any great hope of the patient
recovering.
DISCUSSION
For the family caregivers we interviewed, patient autonomy
had only a minor impact on them and did not guide treatment
decisions. We found a discrepancy between patients’ wishes
against prolongation of treatment in severe conditions such as
the VS and the surrogates’ decisions to continue ANH and
other forms of life-sustaining treatment. The caregivers in our
study considered ANH as a form of basic care that could not
be rejected. All patients were artiﬁcially nourished and hydrated.
The patients’ wishes were overruled by three types of reason:
(a) the expected recovery of the patient, (b) the family care-
giver ’s deﬁnition of life-sustaining treatment and (c) the moral
obligation to not cause the patient harm or pain. We found
a type of family caregivers who was ambivalent towards deci-
sions about life-sustaining treatment. They try to balance their
own moral and medical assumptions and the patients will and
come to inconsistent decisions for and against treatment
measures.
A lack of representation of patient autonomy in decisions
about life-sustaining treatment was also described in an inter-
view study with older patients in nursing homes in Norway.16
The authors argued that relatives wanted to continue life-
sustaining treatment to avoid the loss or to avoid a bad
conscience not having done enough for the patient. In an early
study with family caregivers of patients in the VS it was reported
that even when family caregivers did not expect the patient to
improve, the majority wanted the patient to undergo almost all
therapeutic interventions including surgery.17 Another qualita-
tive study identiﬁed how surrogates come to their decisions on
life-sustaining treatment. The majority of the surrogates based
their decisions on knowledge of the patients’ wishes or advance
directives. A minority planned to make decisions based on a sense
of shared values or on their own personal beliefs about acceptable
quality of life of the patient, which in some cases did not match
what they knew about their loved one’s beliefs.18
It is remarkable that half of the family caregivers reported
knowing the treatment wishes of their patients, mostly referring
to advance directives or previous oral statements. However, not
all wishes were exactly related to the VS and needed interpreta-
tion and application by the caregivers, who were the legal
surrogates in all cases but one. Especially when there was a lack of
knowledge about the patient’s expressed wishes, the family
caregivers interpreted the patient’s non-verbal behaviour as
purposeful expressions of a will to live. The problem of inter-
preting aversive or cheerful behaviour with regard to end-of-life
decisions is well known from dementia patients.19 Loved ones of
patients in a VS may be especially tempted to read meaning into
the patient’s involuntary behaviour to recognise the patient’s
identity and in order to share or even delegate the responsibility
to the patient. However, it could be possible that some of the
patients are misdiagnosed as being in a minimally conscious state
(MCS) or incomplete locked-in syndrome and thus being able to
show purposeful behaviour or even to communicate rudimen-
tarily. Misdiagnosis rates of 40% have been reported before.5 Yet
being in a MCS does not necessarily mean the patient has
a higher quality of life,12 but has a better prognosis.8 The differ-
ential diagnosis is also relevant for attitudes towards end-of-life
issues. It was shown in a recent European survey that doctors and
nurses have different believes about patients’ pain perception20
and different attitudes towards end-of-life decisions for patients
in the VS compared to patients in the MCS, considering it more
acceptable to stop treatment in a chronic VS.21
The hope for a remarkable recovery of the patient has been
described in the literature and is considered crucial for the
caregivers’ successful coping with the situation.22 It can partly
be explained by the uncertainty of prognosis. Although the
current guidelines see only a small probability for the recovery of
patients in a VS in the chronic state, like the ones we referred
to in this study,10 11 there are scientiﬁc reports of late recovery,
as well.6
Wijdicks and Rabinstein described three types of families
dealing with decisions about life-sustaining treatment: (1) real-
ists that understand the gravity of the situation and know that
prolonged care for a patient in a VS would be futile, (2)
procrastinators who were unsure or have heard of unexpected
recoveries and (3) ﬁghters who were willing to sacriﬁce them-
selves for the patient and put trust in a miraculous recovery.23
Some of the interviewed family caregivers in our study hoped
that the patient might eventually be able to communicate
verbally again, others were in acceptance of the current condi-
tion as the ﬁnal stage of recovery and a third type was preparing
themselves for the patient’s death. It has been investigated in
prior studies that family caregivers of patients in the VS go
through phases of shock, bereavement and ﬁnally adaption in
which the family caregivers develop an increased ability to let go
of the patient.24 We found a fourth type of family caregivers
being ambivalent between hope, anticipatory grief and accep-
tance of the condition.
The term ‘life-sustaining treatment measures’ was often
interpreted differently than how it would be deﬁned medically.
ANH or administration of antibiotics was not seen as a medical
but ‘normal’ or ‘basic’ treatment by the family caregivers in this
study. Conversely, respiration, surgery and resuscitation were
seen as technical or invasive medical procedures that may be
omitted. A moral distinction between various forms of treat-
ment is well known from studies of clinical practice.25 One of
the reasons underpinning the reluctance to forego ANH is the
fear of letting the patient ‘starve to death’. Another fear of
withdrawing ANH or artiﬁcial respiration is the fear of legal
consequences, which reveals a lack of knowledge of the legal
framework in Germany that actually allows omission and
withdrawal of treatment. Suffering from starvation could only
be the case if the patient was indeed aware. But even then,
the evidence from studies about the withdrawal of food and
ﬂuids in older people or dementia patients argue against
suffering and show that dehydration can even be a palliative
means leading to a peaceful death.26 Removing foods but
not ﬂuids leads to a prolonged dying phase with cachexia that
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may indeed cause severe suffering in those patients able to
perceive it.
Interventions fostering advance care planning have been
recommended for dementia patients.27 Advance care planning is
usually understood as an alliance with the patient (or future
patient). It may also be applicable to the situation of incompe-
tent patients, like patients in a VS, where the family surrogates
could be the main target of this process and the result is an
‘advance directive by proxy’ or a ‘prospective care plan’.28 We
identiﬁed a high uncertainty regarding the legal framework of
limitation of treatment measures. To inform family caregivers
on legal matters and the ethical weight of patient autonomy
a brochure could be a successful and sustainable intervention. In
addition, counselling and access to psychological support for
surrogates could be an important factor in improving their
decision-making process for the sake of the patients and for their
own sake. It should be investigated more closely whether deci-
sions on life-sustaining treatment are made intuitively or
rationally, and whether the arguments we found are reasons or
justiﬁcations for the surrogate’s intuitive decisions. A prospec-
tive study should look at how caregivers’ perspectives change
during the course of the illness.
LIMITATIONS
This qualitative interview study did not investigate a represen-
tative sample. Gatekeepers might have selected role model
caregivers that were engaged in the care of the patient. There
was a cultural bias in excluding participants that did not speak
German ﬂuently. In that we encouraged the participation
without further incentives other than helping to improve
knowledge on the issue, we were unable to reach disengaged
caregivers. Legal guardians of other patients in a VS might have
decided during the early stages to discontinue life support.
Furthermore, we do not know if the participants were always
willing to reveal their knowledge of the patients’ wishes in the
interviews. We also do not know if their interpretations really
represented the patient’s wish. Even advance directives are not
always easy to interpret and we did not investigate the patients
advance directives, but depended solely on the participant’s
narration. Prospective study designs would be necessary in order
to provide a representative picture of caregivers of patients in
a VS. Our sample was too small to investigate whether the
social roles in the relationships between caregivers and patients
had an impact on decision making. It can be hypothesised that
mothers of patients are more reluctant to forgo treatment than
husbands of patients, but this has to be conﬁrmed in quanti-
tative studies with larger samples. The VS diagnoses of the
patients in this study were not examined by the researchers. In
Germany, VS and MCS29 are not yet consistently discerned, so
it is possible that the patients in our study may in fact be in
a MCS, but are labelled as being in a VS.5
CONCLUSIONS
We identiﬁed a gap between the legally and ethically justiﬁed
norms and current practice. Theoretically, family caregivers
should inform about the patient’s wishes. Practically, the family
caregivers of several patients in a VS in the long-term care made
their own decisions and did not necessarily base them on the
patients’ will. There was a discrepancy between the patients’
wishes against prolongation of treatment and the surrogates’
decisions to continue ANH and other forms of life-sustaining
treatment. The caregivers considered ANH as a form of basic
care that could not be rejected. We also identiﬁed a group of
ambivalent caregivers who are hesitant to make irreversible
decisions. Surrogate decision makers require support in the form
of active information and structured communication.
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